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DUE PROCESS
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)
In Wolff v. McDonnell, the United States
Supreme Court examined prison disciplinary
hearings in light of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment,2 and determined
what rights must be afforded state prison in-
mates facing internal disciplinary proceedings
which could result in the loss of good-time
credit.3 McDonnell, on behalf of himself and
other inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Cor-
rectional Complex, filed a complaint for damages
and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4
The major allegations were that the disciplinary
proceedings at the prison violated due process,
that the regulations governing inmates' mail
were unconstitutionally restrictive, and that the
inmate legal assistance program did not meet
constitutional standards.
5
Under the system which inmate McDonnell
'418 U.S. 539 (1974).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in per-
tinent part: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law...."
3 NF.REv.STAT. § 83-1.107 (Supp. 1972) pro-
vides for the allowance and reduction of good-
time. Good-time accumulates if a prisoner exempli-
fies good behavior and a faithful performance of
duties. The accumulated time is then subtracted
from the prisoner's maximum sentence, which in
effect may speed up a prisoner's eligibility for pa-
role. For a good discussion of good-time and the
distinction between statutory good-time which is
mandatory and meritorious good-time which is dis-
cretionary see Sawyer v. Siegler, 320 F. Supp. 690
(D. Neb. 1970).
4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the person injured in
an action of law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceedings for redress.
5 The constitutional standard is found in John-
son v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969), where the
Court held that "unless and until the State pro-
vides some reasonable alternative to assist inmates
in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction
relief," inmates could not be barred from furnish-
ing assistance to each other.
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challenged, forfeiture or withholding of goof--
time credits or confinement in a disciplinary'
cell was the punishment for serious miscon--
duct. Deprivation of privileges was provided'
for less serious misconduct. 6 The district court
found that the following procedures were in ef-
fect to establish misconduct.7 The convict was.
called to a conference with the chief correction,
supervisor and the charging party, at which,
the prisoner was orally informed of the charge-
and a preliminary discussion of the merits oc--
curred. A report was then prepared and sent-
to the Adjustment Committee.8 A hearing was-
held before this committee in which the report
was read to the inmate and discussed. If he de-
nied the charge, the inmate was allowed to ask
questions of the charging party, but he had no-
right to present, confront or cross-examine-
witnesses, or to be represented by counsel at,
the hearing. The committee would conduct ad-
ditional investigations if it desired before pun--
ishment was imposed.
The challenged mail regulation called for the-
reading and inspection of all incoming and'.
outgoing mail, with no exception made for-
attorney-prisoner mail. Apart from the right to-
counsel in the disciplinary proceedings them-
selves, the challenged legal assistance progran
at the prison directed the Warden to appoint
one inmate as legal advisor. No other inmate
was allowed to assist another in the prepara-
tion of legal documents without the specific
written permission of the Warden.
The district court, after an evidentiary hear-
ing, granted only partial relief. Based on the
circuit court decision in Morrissey v. Brewer,9
the court rejected the claim that the Nebraska
prison disciplinary system violated due process.
6 NFm. REv. STAT. § 83-185 (Supp. 1972).
7 McDonnel v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616, 625-626
(1972).
8 The committee functions as the prison's disci-
plinary body, and is composed of three prison
officials.
9 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S.
471 (1972). Here the circuit court rejected a simi-
lar due process claim with regard to parole revo-
cation hearings.
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'The court ruled that prison officials could open
mail from attorneys if contraband was not dis-
.closed by normal techniques, and if there was a
reasonable possibility that contraband was in-
'cluded in the mail. In addition, the attorney
mail marked "privileged" could only be opened
in the presence of the inmate. Finally, the re-
-strictions placed on the inmate legal assistance
program were found to be constitutional.'0
The court of appeals reversed with respect
to the due process claim,li relying on the inter-
vening Supreme Court decisions of Morrissey
v. Brewer'2 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli,'3 decided
after the district court opinion in this case.
Morrissey held that due process imposed cer-
tain minimum requirements which must be
satisfied before parole could be revoked.
14
Scarpelli decided that these established re-
quirements were applicable to probation re-
'vocation hearings as well.' 5 The court of
appeals thus reasoned that in view of these
-decisions, prisoners facing disciplinary hearings
should be afforded these same minimum due
process rights. The circuit court also ordered
removed from prison records any determina-
tions of misconduct established in proceedings
that failed to comport with due process, and
generally affirmed the district court judgment
regarding correspondence with attorneys. Fur-
thermore, the court of appeals reversed the dis-
10 The district court neglected to inquire
-whether the inmates were ever given permission to
assist each other; the court assumed that they
'vere given such permission. 342 F. Supp. at 621.
11483 F2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1973).
12408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process in parole
revocation hearings).
'3411 U.S. 778 (1973) (due process in proba-
tion revocation hearings).
14 408 U.S. at 489. These procedures included:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of
parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evi-
dence against him; (c) opportunity to be
heard in person and to present witnesses and
documentary evidence; (d) the right to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for
not allowing confrontation); (e) a neutral
-and detached hearing body; (f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied upon and reasons for revoking parole.
.1d.
15 The Court added to the required minimum
procedures of Morrissey the right to counsel, when
a probationer makes a request based on a claim of
innocence or that the issues and defenses are com-
plex or otherwise difficult to develop.
trict court on the inmate legal assistance issue,
arguing that the record did not support the as-
sumption that permission for inmates to assist
each other was freely given.' 6
Mr. Justice White, writing for a six man
majority,' 7 reversed the liberal grant of rights
decreed by the circuit court with regard to
proceduires required in a prison disciplinary
hearing. Specifically, the Court held that there
was only a limited right to present evidence
and call witnesses, and that prisoners had no
right to confrontation, cross-examination, or
counsel in a prison disciplinary proceeding.
The Supreme Court also ruled that prisoners
had the unconditional right to at least twenty-
four hours written notice of the claimed viola-
tion, and a written statement of the evidence
relied upon together with the reasons for any
disciplinary action. The majority further ruled
that it was constitutionally permissible for
prison officials to open, in an inmate's pres-
ence, incoming attorney mail that could not be
otherwise examined for contraband. Finally,
the Court affirmed the circuit court's holding
on the inmate legal assistance issue.
Before reaching the merits of the case, Jus-
tice White considered the jurisdictional ques-
tion of whether the validity of the procedures
for depriving prisoners of good-time credits
could even by considered in a civil rights suit
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This question
was answered in the affirmative in Preiser v.
Rodriguez' l where the Court pointed out that
habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy
for damage claims, which could be pressed
under § 1983 in conjunction with suits challeng-
ing the conditions of confinement rather than
the fact or length of custody.
The majority stated certain guidelines that
were applicable to their discussion of due
process in prison disciplinary hearings. The
Court argued that since prison disciplinary
proceedings were not part of a criminal prose-
cution, all of the rights due a defendant in
16 483 F.2d at 1065.
'
7justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion;
Justice Marshall wrote a separate dissenting opin-
ion in which Justice Brennan concurred.
18411 U.S. 475 (1973). Here state prisoners
brought a § 1983 suit seeking an injunction to
compel restoration of good-time credits. The Court
held that the sole remedy was by writ of habeas
corpus, because the prisoners were challenging the
very fact or duration of their confinement.
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such criminal proceedings did not necessarily
apply. More succinctly Justice White stated
that "[T]here must be mutual accommodation
between institutional needs and objectives and
the provisions of the Constitution that are of
general application." '19 The Court reasoned
that simply because a prisoner retained certain
rights under the due process clause 0 did not
mean that those rights could not be subject to
restrictions imposed by the particular regime
to which the prisoner had been committed.2'
From these guidelines, the majority ruled that
the Constitution did not demand that all of the
Morrissey-Scarpelli 22 procedures be made ap-
plicable to disciplinary cases in state prisons.
The Court drew a questionable distinction be-
tween deprivation of good-time and revocation
of parole. The latter imposed an immediate
change in the condition of the parolee's liberty,
while the former did not pose an immediate
change to the prison inmate. In realit3y, the
two situations are identical in that both de-
prive a person of liberty; the parolee is af-
fected immediately and returned to prison,
while the prison inmate suffers an extension of
his maximum term and postponement of the
date of eligibility for parole.23
In further substantiating their refusal to ex-
19418 U.S. at -. By institutional needs Justice
White wasapparently referring to the necessity of
maintaining security and discipline in a rehabilita-
tive context.
20 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)
(Court does not dismiss prisoner's inartfully
drawn petition); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. 249 (1971); Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91
(1945).
21 See e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.
Ct. 2547 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 610 (1973); Civil Service Commission v.
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
22 See notes 15, 16 supra.
23 Prior to the Court's attempt to draw this dis-
tinction, they had engaged the question of whether
the interest of prisoners in disciplinary procedures
was included in the "liberty" protected by the
fourteenth amendment. They said
The State itself has not only provided a statu-
tory right to good-time but also specifies that
it is to be forfeited only for serious misbehav-
ior .... We think a person's liberty is equally
protected, even when the liberty itself is a
statutory creation of the State.
418 U.S. at -.
The Court thus recognized that the deprivation
of good-time is a deprivation of liberty. Should
immediacy or the inherent deprivation of liberty
itself be the criteria for those essential due
process rights?
tend the full range of procedures provided in
Morrissey, the Court pointed out that the State
had a different stake in the structure and con-
tent of the prison disciplinary hearing than it
did in a parole revocation proceeding. In this
regard, the Court showed concern for the
tense, closed, and tightly controlled environ-
ment of a state prison. The necessity for close
supervision and the maintenance of order were
paramount security considerations: "[I]t [was]
against this background that disciplinary pro-
cedures must be structured by prison
authorities." 24 The Court allowed flexibility in
the disciplinary procedures and did not impose
the rights2 5 which might call for adversary
proceedings typical of the criminal trial.
The Court then focused on specific rights
that must be provided to inmates in prison dis-
ciplinary proceedings if the minimum require-
ments of due process were to be satisfied. First,
the Court found that adequate notice was not
being provided to inmates and ruled that
twenty-four hour advanced written notice of
the claimed violation must be given to the
inmate.26 This requirement would give the
prisoner sufficient time to clarify what the
charges were and prepare a defense. Secondly,
in accord with Morrissey, the Court held that
there must be a "written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for the disciplinary action." 27 This
requirement, according to the majority, served
two purposes. One was to protect the inmate
against collateral consequences resulting from
a misunderstanding of the nature of the origi-
nal proceeding, 28 and the other, to insure that
administrators will act fairly in the discipli-
nary hearing.
Justice White persistently referred to the
written statement as a written record of the
proceedings, but the holding of the Court did
24418 U.S. at -.
25 The majority was mindful of the fact that the
instant case did not concern a criminal proceeding,
but rather a disciplinary hearing. The issue in
Morrissey did not concern a criminal matter ei-
ther, but nevertheless the Court mandated a wide
range of essential due process rights.
26 418 U.S. at-.
27 Id.
28 Deprivation of good-time is a factor given se-
rious consideration by a parole board. The Court
was apparently concerned that parole boards were
sufficiently apprised of the circumstances surround-
ing removal of good-time credits.
[Vol. 65--
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not necessarily imply that a transcript of the
hearing need be made. The holding simply
mandated a statement showing the evidence re-
lied on and reasons for actions taken.2 9
In discussing further rights which might be
applicable to disciplinary hearings, the Court
found that there was no unrestricted right of
an inmate to call witnesses or present docu-
mentary evidence in his defense. A prisoner
should be allowed to exercise these rights
"when permitting him to do so will not be
unduly hazardous to institutional safety or
correctional goals." 30 The majority balanced
the inmate's interest in avoiding loss of good-
time against the needs of the prison and con-
cluded that they must provide the prison ad-
ministrators with some amount of flexibility.
The Court considered these unrestricted rights
potentially disruptive and argued that prison
administrators were in the best position to
evaluate individual situations and determine
when to restrict the calling of witnesses and
the presentation of evidence. However, the
possibility of disruption is arguable in view of
the tightly controlled environment which the
majority acknowledged. In addition, the Court
increased the possibility for administrative ar-
bitrariness by suggesting rather than mandat-
ing that the hearing committee state its rea-
sons for refusing to call a witness. Justice
Douglas' dissent criticized this aspect of the
majority opinion because it left a prisoner's
exercise of a fundamental constitutional right
within the unreviewable discretion of prison
authorities. 3
1
In denying to the inmates the rights of con-
frontation and cross-examination, the majority
considered the institutional interests paramount
to the due process arguments. Assuming that
these rights if exercised in a prison context
held great potential for disruption and havoc,
the Court held that "adequate bases for deci-
sion in prison disciplinary hearings can be ar-
rived at without cross-examination." 32 The
29 The Court also stated that the written state-
ment may also properly exclude some evidence
when necessary to maintain institutional or per-
sonal safety. Such a determination is entirely
within the discretionary power of the prison
officials.
30 418 U.S. at-.
31 Id. at - (Douglas, 3., dissenting).
32 Id. at -. The Court, however, did not cite
any specific examples of where granting these
majority rested this decision in part upon the
existence of what it characterized as diverse
and experimental prison practices, saying that
in such a situation it was better to leave these
matters to the "sound discretion" of state
prison officials. 33 Thus the Court appears un-
willing to assume a leading role in providing
reform for the prison system.
The logic the Court used to reach its posi-
tion regarding confrontation and cross-exami-
nation was criticized by Justice Marshall. He
pointed out in a vigorous dissent that his disa-
greement stemmed "from the majority's view
that these rights [were] just not all that
important." Justice White responded that
these rights were obviously essential in crimi-
nal trials where an accused may suffer serious
deprivations such as a loss of liberty, or moral
turpitude may be attributed to his conduct which
may result in the loss of a job. According to
Justice White, however, these rights were not
universally applicable to all hearings. 35
Justice White's position suggests that these
rights are not as crucial in a prison hearing
as they are in a criminal trial. This reasoning
is tenuous in light of the circumstances of the
instant case. The withdrawal of accumulated
good-time could mean an additional prison sen-
tence of eighteen months, unquestionably a
more serious penalty than the loss of a job.30
Furthermore, Justice White's position is un-
substantiated by authority or the logic which
mandates the imposition of due process
rights.
3 7
The majority also refused to impose the re-
rights actually created the disruption they pre-
dicted.
3
3 Id. at -.
34 Id. at - (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35 Justice White's position on this point is based
solely on his own separate opinion in Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (White, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
36 418 U. S. at - (Marshall, J., dissenting).
37 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269
(1970), where the Court stated, "[i]n almost every
setting where important decisions turn on ques-
tions of fact, due process requires an opportunity
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses."
In Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959),
cross-examination and confrontation were decreed
applicable whenever "[g]overnmental action seri-
ously injures an individual, and the reasonableness
of the action depends on fact findings." See also
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) ; In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1967).
1974]
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quirement of counsel on the prison disciplinary
hearing. The Court argued that the presence of
counsel would give the proceedings a more ad-
versary cast and thus reduce their utility as a
means to enhance correctional objectives.3 s
The majority cited Scarpelli for the proposi-
tion that counsel would prolong the decision-
making process and increase the financial bur-
dens of the state.39 In denying the right to
counsel, the Court attempted to remain consist-
ent with its position of not interjecting into
the disciplinary system a right that could inter-
fere with the flexibility and control of prison
officials.
Thus, with respect to the issue of due proc-
ess in prison disciplinary hearings, the Su-
preme Court finally consolidated the various
approaches taken by circuit courts. 40  The
38 418 U.S. at -.
39 In Scarpelli, the Court listed these burdens as
being costs "for appointed counsel, counsel for the
State, a longer record, and the possibility of judi-
cial review." 411 U.S. at 788.
40 The Ninth Circuit is by far the most liberal.
This is apparent in Clutchette v. Procunier, 497
F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), where the Court required
(a) written notice in advance; (b) a written
statement of reasons and a written record of the
proceedings must be provided; (c) full power and
right of an inmate to call witnesses; (d) a gen-
eral right of cross-examination, which may be lim-
ited, however, where there is a legitimate fear that
retribution will result; (e) that counsel must be
provided where a prison rule violation may be
punishable by state law; (f) an impartial hearing
board, and a member of the board may not partic-
pate in the case as an investigating or reviewing
officer, or be a witness.
In contrast are Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d
933 (3d Cir. 1973) and Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). These circuits agreed
that (a) oral notice is sufficient; (b) no written
statement of reasons nor a written record need be
provided to the prisoner; (c) prisoners had no
right to present witnesses at a hearing; (d) due
process did not require cross-examination; (e)
there was no right to counsel, nor even lay substi-
tutes; (f) the hearing board must be impartial.
See also Meyers v. Aldredge, 492 F.2d 296 (3d
Cir. 1974), where the court affirmed that oral no-
tice was sufficient, and also stated that there was
no right to counsel where counsel substitute was
provided.
The Seventh Circuit held in U.S. ex rel. Miller
v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973), that
(a) written notice was required in advance; (b)
there must be an opportunity to request the calling
of witnesses; (c) there must be an impartial hear-
ing board.
The First Circuit in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 487
F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973), elaborated that (a)
where prison authorities had already extended the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
then there is no reason to force authorities to call
Court chose to follow the more restrictive ap-
proach set out in Braxton v. Carlson and
Sostre v. McGinnis.41
The Court also discussed several other is-
sues. Concerned that a ruling to the contrary
would place an intolerable burden on the ad-
ministration of all prisons in the country, the
majority reversed the court of appeals decision
to expunge prison records. In Morrissey due
process requirements were made applicable
only to future revocations of parole. The Court
denied retrospective application in the instant
case as well. The majority also held that mail
from an attorney may be opened by prison of-
ficials, but only in the presence of the inmate.
In this way the state could enforce the prison
regulations against contraband without the
danger of censorship because the presence of
the inmate would insure that the mail would
not be read. Finally, the contention that the in-
mate legal assistance program at the Complex
was constitutionally deficient was remanded to
be considered by the district court in light of
the Johnson v. Avery standard.42
Justice Douglas' dissent strongly criticized
the majority's holding concerning an inmate's
due process rights in a prison disciplinary hear-
ing. Recognizing, as the majority conceded, that
prisoners are persons within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment, then they, argued Justice
Douglas, should have a full hearing with all the
Morrissey-Scarpelli due process safeguards. 43
He proposed that prisoners be allowed con-
frontation and cross-examination, unless prison
officials found good cause for not allowing these
rights. Douglas pointed out that leaving such
discretionary power in the hands of a prison
disciplinary board for reasons of security and
discipline was "outmoded and indeed antireha-
bilitation." 44 Leaving the exercise of funda-
mental constitutional rights in the unreviewable
discretion of prison authorities, he contended,
fostered feelings among the inmates that prison
authorities were authoritarian and arbitrary.45
adverse witnesses when the prisoner could have;
(b) there is a right to retained counsel, even
where a staff assistant is available.
41 See note 40 supra.
42 See note 5 supra.
43 See notes 15, 16 supra.
44 418 U.S. at-, (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45 Indeed, Douglas points out the Court's lan-
guage in Morrissey, where the majority argued
[Vol. 65
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The crux of his position was that placing the
constitutional rights of an inmate in the hands
of a prison administrator's discretion was like
placing a defendant's rights in the hands of the
prosecutor.4
8
Justice Marshall, joined by justice Brennan,
expressed similar criticism. They argued that
the inmate was stripped of the essential tools
necessary for the presentation of a meaningful
defense. They evidenced concern for the
wrongfully charged inmate and pointed out
that the majority's reliance upon the preven-
tion of disruption and havoc was hardly re-
lated to an inmate's right to call defense
witnesses. 47 Prison security must be made to
accommodate fundamental constitutional princi-
ples, they argued, and not the reverse. Marshall
cited Clutchette v. Procunier48 for the proposi-
tion that "concern for the safety of inmates does
not justify a wholesale denial of the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses."49 He pointed out that the disciplinary
process was almost always initiated by a
correctional officer rather than a fellow inmate,
and the State of Nebraska even informed ac-
cused inmates of the particular correctional of-
ficer who made the charge.50 Marshall argued
that this minimized the concern for security
and disruption emphasized by the majority
opinion, and that a legitimate concern for se-
crecy would affect only a small fraction of dis-
ciplinary cases.
The dissenters would therefore hold that the
inmates' right to confront and cross-examine
that society had an interest in treating the parolee
fairly partly because "fair treatment in parole rev-
ocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation
by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness." 408 U.S. at
484. Douglas contended, and arguably so, that the
same principle applied to inmates as well. See also
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIcE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: CoRRCEcroNs 83, 88 (1967).
46 418 U.S. at -, (Douglas, J., dissenting). This
fear has substantial basis. In Arkansas recently an
entire prison system was held to be a violation of
the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971). See also the case studies in Hirschop
and Millman, The Unconstitutionality of Prison
Life, 55 Va. L. REv. 795, 795-812 (1969).
47 418 U.S. at-.
48 See note 40 supra.
45 497 F.2d at 819.
50 418 U.S. at - (Marshall, J. dissenting).
adverse witnesses should be recognized, subject
only to a very limited exception when neces-
sary to protect the identity of a confidential in-
mate informant. Marshall and Brennan also
agreed that when this exception was exercised,
the disciplinary board had an obligation to call
the witness in camera and probe his credibility,
rather than accepting his unchallenged word. 51
The majority opinion adopted the traditional
role which courts have assumed in dealing
with prison affairs. This role has been one of
self-imposed restraint, which has come to be
known as the "hands off" doctrine.52 This ap-
proach vested wide discretion in prison officials
to control prisoners in their custody. Numer-
ous rationales have been submitted in support
of this doctrine. Among the most frequently dis-
cussed are that prison management is the re-
sponsibility of the executive branch and should
not be interfered with by the judiciary, that
courts lack expertise in the field of prison
management, and that courts might embarrass
high officials by showing the public the real
conditions within a prison.53
This judicial attitude of restraint began to
erode with respect to certain matters of prison
administration in the late 1960's. This was evi-
denced especially in the ruling of the United
States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Avery.
The Court in Johnson paved the way for judi-
cial inspection of administrative unfairness in
prison systems, saying that "[i]n instances
where state regulations applicable to inmates of
prison facilities conflict with [federal
constitutional] rights, the regulations may be
invalidated." 5 The Supreme Court in other
decisions recognized constitutional protections
guaranteed to prisoners, such as religious free-
dom,55 right of access to the courts,5 6 and
51 Id. at - (Marshall, J. dissenting).
52 For a general discussion of this doctrine and
the historical backround of procedural due process
in prison disciplinary hearings see Kraft, Prison
Disciplinary Practices and Procedures: Is Due
Process Provided? 47 N.D.L. REv. 1, 11-14
(1970); Comment, Procedural Due Process for
Intraprison Disciplinary Hearings: An Arkansas
Analysis, 27 Aium L. REv. 44, 46-51 (1973).
53 Note, Due Process Safeguards in Prison Dis-
ciplinary Proceedings: The Application of the
Goldberg Balancing Test, 49 N.D.L. REv. 675,
683-85 (1972-73).
54393 U.S. at 486.
55 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cooper
v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
56 Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
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equal protection from invidious discrimination
based on race."
However, the Supreme Court in McDonnell
departed from this trend toward judicial in-
volvement in prison affairs. The Court could
have seized the opportunity to mandate that
prisoners be given those due process rights
that would minimize what has been character-
ized as the authoritarian and arbitrary nature
of prison disciplinary proceedings. 58 Instead,
the Court placed in the hands of prison admin-
istrators wide discretion which may result in a
longer prison sentence.
Surely a prison administrator has an interest
in maintaining security as well as promoting
efficiency within the system. The danger arises,
5
T Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).58 See note 45 supra.
however, when an overemphasis on efficiency
may lead to a denial of fair procedure and an
imposition of arbitrariness, which can only
serve to embitter inmates.5 9 The Court de-
clared that their conclusions were "not graven
in stone," and that a different holding might
be warranted by future internal changes in the
prison disciplinary system.60 The wait for the
internally initiated changes may be a long one
indeed.
59 See Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062,
1094 (M.D. Fla. 1973), vacated and renmanded for
lack of a three judge court, 491 F2d 417 (1973),
where it was stated that the Constitution follows
an inmate into prison. The court pointed out that
due process rights such as confrontation and
cross-examination become vital in administrative
proceedings where ordinary rules of procedure are
relaxed.
60 418 U.S. at-.
[Vol. 65
